136 occurrences of therefore etc in this volume.
[Clear Hits]

SUBSCRIBER:


past masters commons

Annotation Guide:

cover
The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
cover
Ordinatio. Book 3. Distinctions 1 - 17.
Book 3. Distinctions 1 - 17
Sixteenth Distinction
Question Two. Whether it was in the power of Christ’s Soul not to Die from the Violence of the Passion
I. To the First Question
A. Opinion of Others
2. Rejection of the Opinion

2. Rejection of the Opinion

20. These arguments are not conclusive because the conclusions of all of them - apart from the last - apply as much to the body of Christ as it is now after the resurrection (and to our bodies too after the last judgment) as to his body as it was before.

21. The first argument [n.15] is not conclusive because Christ’s body has now the same potency of matter as before, and it is similarly deprived, for it has no other act now than before; therefore just as the act or form of his soul did not take away every privation before when it communicated itself to the body through the essence, so neither does it do so after the resurrection.

22. The second and third arguments are not conclusive [nn.16-17] because Christ’s body in heaven is a mixed body, and there is contrariety in it there as before. The elements too by nature are in their proper places, although they are outside, and more outside, their places now than they were when in Christ’s body before his death; and in the body in itself, and not as it is taken as to its sense organs, earth dominates the most; but earth is most outside its place when it is in heaven, and so it would, by desiring its proper place, do most to cause corruption.

23. The fourth argument [n.18] is not conclusive because the same result follows for the organic parts, for they will, after the resurrection, be of the same complexion as they were before; otherwise they would not be the same parts. So if they were cause of corruption before they will still be so afterwards; and so their complexion will be as necessarily corrupted afterwards as before if they were a necessary cause of corruption.

24. Now the fifth argument [n.19] assumes a false premise, namely that everything generable has a definite period etc.; for posit some stone in existence and take away everything external that is corruptive of it; if the divine maintaining power is also posited along with this general fact, the stone will never be corrupted; it is not then because of an extrinsic agent or because it has a definite limit of duration that it is corrupted. But if mixed bodies are necessarily corrupted, this is through an intrinsic cause, and especially in the case of animate things since in these a contrary quality dominates - as heat, which however is continually fostered in the wet and the wet continually tends toward corruption through the action of the heat. Thus at length, through the action of the heat, there is a corruption of the wet at the root, being a quicker corruption in some and slower in others according as the action of the heat is more or less strong. And so there is no need for a definite external corruptive cause. And thus the limit of generable and mixed corruptible things is longer or shorter because of an intrinsic cause; and something within is cause of the period of corruption rather than something outside. Likewise, the simple elements in mixed bodies are not corrupted in their totality but in part, and that because of the action of some other contrary on them. - But why is it that the contrary acts on it now and not earlier? Surely from the removal of the extrinsic cause that was conserving and producing it always the same. For fire here below is corrupted in winter by the action of the dominating cold, the cause of which is the sun being further away; while in the summer the fire part is generated and the cold near the fire is corrupted, the cause of which is the nearness of the sun. Remove these causes and a simple body is not corrupted because of any definite limit it has in itself, but the limit of the thing follows the cause of corruption, and it is longer or shorter for a cause other than the fact that the thing has a limit.